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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EXCLUSION OF NEGROES
FROM VOTING AT PRIMARIES AS PARTY
OR STATE ACTION
Overruling an earlier decision,' the United States Supreme Court
in Smith v. Allwright2 held that the State of Texas was violating the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Consti-
tution by permitting the Democratic party to exclude Negroes from
voting in primaries.
The point around which the controversy turns is whether the action
of the Democratic party is state action .or individual party action.3
State action excluding Negroes from voting is prohibited by the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
In Nixon v. Herndon,4 a statute providing that "... in no event
shall a Negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic party primary
election held in the State of Texas' 5 was held void as being in violation
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
statute clearly involved state action directly, and came within the limi-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
After the above decision the legislature of Texas repealed the stat-
ute declared unconstitutional and enacted a new law 6 whereby the
power was transferred from the State to an agency of the State, a
political party.
In Nixon v. Condon7 the United. States Supreme Court held that
the statute made the committee a repository of official power, an
agency of the state. The court further held that parties and their rep-
resentatives have become custodians of official power and that, if
heed is to be given to the realities of.political life, they are now agencies
1 Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 55 Sup. Ct. 622, 79 L.Ed. 1292 (1935).
2 Smith v. Allvright, 64 Sup. Ct. 757 (1944).
3 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18 (1833), stated it is a state action
of a particular character that is prohibited by the first section of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject
matter of the Amendment * * * It nullifies and makes void all state legislation
and state action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States, or which denies to any of them the equal
protection of the law * * * These civil rights are guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion against State aggression; invasion of these rights by wrongful acts of
individuals, unsupported by state authority in the shape of laws, customs, orjudicial or executive proceedings is not prohibited by the Constitution.
4 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 47 Sup. Ct. 446, 71 L.Ed. 759 (1927).
5 2 Tex. Laws 2d Spec. Sess., p. 74 (1923).
6 Tex Laws, p. 193 (1927) "Every political party in this State through its State
Executive Committee shall have the power to prescribe the qualifications of its
own members and shall, in its own way determine who shall be qualified to
vote or otherwise participate in such political party * * *"
7Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 62 Sup. Ct. 484, 76 L.Ed. 984, 88 A.L.R. 458
(1932).
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of the State. The statute was held unconstitutional as violating the
Fourteenth Amendment.
After the decision of the court in Nixon v. Condon, the legislature
of Texas repealed the statutory provision passed upon in Nixon v.
Condon, retaining only laws relating to primary procedure. The Demo-
cratic Convention met and passed a resolution reading as follows:
"Be it resolved that all white citizens of the State of Texas
who are qualified to vote under the constitution and laws of
the state shall be eligible to membership in the Democratic party
and entitled to participate in its deliberations."
Under the above resolution a Negro was refused a ballot in the
party primary in Texas.
The Supreme Court decided in Grovey v. Townsend' that the de-
termination by the state convention of the membership of the Demo-
cratic party was a significant change from a determination by the Ex-
ecutive Committee. The former was party action voluntary in char-
acter; the latter, as had been held in the Condon case, was action by
authority of the State. For a political party to deny a vote in the pri-
mary was mere refusal of party membership with which the state had
no concern.
In United States v. Classic,9 where an action was brought against
election officials conducting a primary election to nominate a party
candidate for representative in Congress, for wilfully altering, falsely
counting, and certifying the ballots, the United States Supreme Court
held as follows: "A primary election which is a necessary step in the
choice of candidates for election as Representatives in Congress, and
which in the circumstances of the case controls that choice is an elec-
tion within the meaning of Art. I, sections 2 and 4 of the Constitution,
and is subject to Congressional regulation. This right of participation
is protected just as the right to vote at the election, where the primary
is by law made an integral part of the election machinery."
The question arises as to how the inconsistency in the Grovey and
the Classic cases can be explained. It is suggested that Grovey v. Town-
send was overruled sub silento in United States v. Classic.10 The prin-
cipal case, Smith v. Allwright, resolves the inconsistency.
In Smith v. Allwright,"' an action was brought by Lonnie Smith
against S. E. Allwright, an election judge, for a declaratory judg-
8 Grovey v. Townsend, supra.
9 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 61 Sup. Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941).
10 Smith v. Allwright, supra.
11 Smith v. Allwright, supra.
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ment, and for damages for refusal of defendants to permit plaintiff
to cast a ballot in a primary election.
The state by-laws required a certain electoral procedure 2 and
prescribed a general election ballot made up of party nominees so
chosen as to limit the choice of electorate in a general election for
state officers, to those whose names appeared on such ballot.
The Supreme Court emphasizing the existence of the procedural
laws held that under such a fact situation, the state endorses, adopts,
and enforces discrimination against Negroes practiced by a political
party intrusted by state law with determination of qualifications of
participants in primary elections; that a state cannot cast its electoral
process in a form which permits a private organization to practice
racial discrimination.
The right to vote comes from the state, 3 but such right is pro-
tected by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments prohibiting the
state from certain discrimination in laying down qualifications for
its voters.
14
A question arises as to whether the action of the political party
can ever be entirely divorced from state action. Immediately follow-
ing the Smith v. Allwright decision, legislatures of some Southern
states enacted bills which separated the Democratic primary from
state government control. Future primaries were to be operated
entirely under party rule, without government sanction, prohibition,
or direction. The problem is whether this procedure severs the bond
between party and state. The answer would seem to be that it does
not. The state and political party can never be entirely separated
where primaries are held and the successful candidate of the party
primary is made a candidate in the general election. The state by
accepting the result of the primary would ratify it, making the un-
lawful act of the so called separated party primary its act. Any dis-
crimination would therefore be state action. The state and its po-
litical parties are too interdependent to be ever entirely separated
from each other. The results of the latter must 'be used in the former.
12 Vernon's TEXAS STATUTES, Article 3118, provides for the election of a county
-chairman. Article 3134-The state convention has authority to choose the
state executive committee and its chairman. Article 3139-Candidates for
offices to be filled by election are required to be nominated at a primary elec-
tion, if the nominating party cast over 100,000 votes at the preceding general
election. Article 3103-Each precinct primary is to be conducted by a presid-
ing judge * * *. Article 3109 prescribes the form of the ballot. Article 3108
requires each candidate to pay a fair share of the cost of the primary.
13 Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 24 Sup. Ct. 573, 48 L.Ed. 817 (1904) ; Mason
v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328, 21 Sup. Ct. 125, 45 L.Ed. 214 (1900); United States
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1874).
14 Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 35 Sup. Ct. 926, 59 L.Ed. 1340 (1915);
Pope v. Williams, supra; James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 23 Sup. Ct. 678,
47 L.Ed. 979 (1903); State ex rel. McGrael v. Phelps, 144 Wis. 1, 128 N.W.
1041, 35 L.R.A. (N.s.) 353 (1910).
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Unlike an election of a club, the results do not remain within the
party primary itself, but the successful candidate's name is placed for
nomination in the general election. It can be readily seen that the
party primary is an integral part of an election and cannot be sep-
arated from it, no matter what methods are used.
Another question is whether the individual's right to vote in a
municipal or state election is protected under the Constitution. Myers
v. Anderson'5 holds: While the Fifteenth Amendment does not confer
the right of suffrage on any class, it does prohibit the States from
depriving any person of the right of suffrage whether for federal,
state, or municipal elections.
The Fifteenth Amendment expressly protects the right to vote.
The right to run for a state office, if protected by the Federal Con-
stitution, must then be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Snowden v. Hughes,16 petitioner's alleged cause of action was
that members of the State Primary Canvassing board, acting as such,
but in violation of state law, had by their false certificate or procla-
mation, and by their refusal to file a true certificate, deprived peti-
tioner of nomination and election for representative in the state
assembly.
The petitioner, in bringing his action, relied on the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The opinion states as follows:
The right to become a candidate for state office is a priv-
ilege of state citizenship and is not protected by the privileges
and immunities clause."
An unlawful denial by state action of a right to state political
office is not a denial of a right of property or of liberty secured by
the due process clause.'8
A violation of the statute is not, without more, a denial of equal
protection of the laws. There must be a showing of clear and inten-
tional discrimination. 9 Thus, the United States Supreme Court in-
dicates that the right to run for an office is protected only by the
equal protection of the laws clause when intentional discrimination
is shown.
BERTRAM HOFFMAN.
15 Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 35 Sup. Ct. 932 59 L.Ed. 1349 (1915).
18 Snowden v. Hughes, 64 Sup. Ct. 397 (1944).
17 In Re Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 74, 79, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873) ; Max-
well v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 538, 40 Sup. Ct. 2, 5, 63 L.Ed. 1124 (1919);
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283, 58 Sup. Ct. 205, 82 L.Ed. 252 (1937).
is Taylr and Marshall v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 20 Sup. Ct. 1009, 44 L.Ed. 1187
(1900); Cave v. State of Missouri ex rel Newell, 246 U.S. 650, 38 Sup. Ct.
334, 62 L.Ed. 921 (1918).
29 Gundling v. City of Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 186, 20 Sup. Ct. 633, 635, 44 L.Ed.
725 (1900) ; Ah Sin v. Wittmnan, 198 U.S. 500, 507, 508, 25 Sup. Ct. 756, 758,
759, 49 L.Ed. 1142 (1905) ; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 26 L.Ed. 567 (1880).
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